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M
easured in terms of either output or employment, the United States





December 2007–February 2010; growth at its average post-1982 rate would
have meant an increase of 3.6 percent over the same interval.
Comparisons to some past episodes, presented in Figure 1, are useful for
evaluating the severity of the current one. The decline in real GDP in 2008
and 2009 is larger than any that the United States has experienced since the
immediate post-World War II period.1 The next largest postwar decline was
3.73 percent, from 1957:Q3–1958:Q1. Even in the early 1980s, GDP never
fellbelowitspreviouspeakbymorethan2.87percent. Employmentbehavior
also looks extreme when compared to other episodes (see Figure 1, Panel B).
Since the end of World War II, the previous greatest peak-to-trough decline
in employment was 4.37 percent from April 1957–June 1958, compared to
the 6.1 percent decline in the Great Recession. And in the early 1980s the
peak-to-trough decline in employment was never greater than 3.1 percent.
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System. The authors acknowledge
helpful comments from Brian Gaines, Thomas Lubik, Yash Mehra, Pierre Sarte, and John
Weinberg. E-mail: alexander.wolman@rich.frb.org.
1 We are deﬁning a decline in real GDP as the difference between the level at its peak
and the level at its subsequent trough. If there are multiple local troughs before real GDP again
reaches its initial peak, we choose the lowest trough to measure the decline.46 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 1 Large Postwar Output and Employment Declines
Panel A: Large Postwar Output Declines, Peak to Trough: Labeled by Peak
























































































































There is thus no doubt about the severity of the decline in economic activ-
ity since late 2007. Understanding why the decline occurred is more difﬁcult.
We aim to take some initial steps toward such an understanding by studying
the behavior of the major components of output and, in less detail, employ-
ment. We will focus especially on the behavior of the housing components
of output and employment. Much popular commentary on the recession has
emphasized the role of the housing bust and the subsequent (and related) ﬁ-
nancialcrisis. Afterdocumentingthatthedeclineinthehousingcomponentof
GDP was of roughly the same magnitude as the decline in GDP itself, we will
use vector autoregressions (VARs) to investigate the extent to which housingS. E. Henly and A. L. Wolman: Housing and the Great Recession 47






























































































































can be identiﬁed as a cause of the decline in aggregate activity. While we
do not propose any economic model to explain the recession, our statistical
analysis may be suggestive for subsequent modeling that does attempt to
assign causality.
1. FACTSABOUT THE RECESSION
Figure 2 displays the annualized quarterly levels of real GDP (right scale) and
real residential investment (left scale) from 2002 to the present. Residential
investment peaked in the fourth quarter of 2005, and fell $439 billion in real
termsthroughthesecondquarterof2009,adeclineofmorethan56percent. As
reported above, real GDP peaked in the second quarter of 2008 and bottomed
out in the second quarter of 2009. The 3.8 percent fall in real GDP represents
about $514 billion in chained 2005 dollars. Thus, the cumulative decrease
in residential investment so far has been approximately the same magnitude
as the decrease in real GDP that ended in the second quarter of this year.
Just as striking as the similarity in magnitudes is the difference in timing of
the declines in residential investment and GDP: Residential investment fell
steadily for two years before GDP began to fall. Evidently other components
weresupportingGDPgrowthduring2006and2007beforeweakeningin2008.
Figures 3 and 4 show that consumption and nonresidential investment ﬁt this48 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly



































































































































description; decreases in those two components—which together account for
80percentofGDP—wereroughlycontemporaneouswiththefallinrealGDP.
Like output, aggregate employment lagged housing-related employment
in the current recession. Figure 5 displays total nonfarm payroll employment,
alongwithemploymentinresidentialbuildingconstruction. Thelatterpeaked
in April 2006 at 1.02 million, and has since fallen by 43 percent, to 586,000
in November 2009. Aggregate employment began to fall 20 months after
residential construction employment, in December 2007, and thus far has
fallen by 6.1 percent, from 138 million to 130 million. Unlike output, the fall
in housing-related employment has been much smaller in absolute terms than
the fall in overall employment.2 Even if we add residential specialty trades to
residential building construction, the decline in housing-construction related
employment amounts to only about one-sixth of the total job losses since
December 2007.
The data portrayed in Figures 2–5 raise many questions. The remainder
of this article will focus on just one of them: To what extent did the fall in
aggregate output represent the economy’s typical lagged response to a shock
2 In percentage terms, whether one looks at employment or output, the decline in housing
construction dwarfs the decline in the aggregate economy.S. E. Henly and A. L. Wolman: Housing and the Great Recession 49






























































































































to the housing sector? Although overall employment fell much more than
employment in home construction, we can and will ask the same question
about employment. That is: Did the large fall in overall employment reﬂect
the normal propagation of a shock to housing? We will determine this normal
statistical pattern using vector autoregressions for the components of output
and employment.
2. BACKGROUND ON VAR METHODOLOGY
A VAR is a statistical model of the behavior across time of a set of variables.
A VAR speciﬁes that the value of each variable in a given time period is a
linear function of (1) the lagged values of all the variables and (2) one or more
exogenous random variables. For our purposes, a VAR for the components
of real GDP (or employment) is useful because it provides a summary of
the relationship between those components over the sample with which the
VAR is estimated. With a VAR, we will be able to assess whether the recent
behavior of real GDP and employment can be interpreted as reﬂecting the
normal response to a large shock to the housing sector.50 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 5 Residential Construction Employment and Total Nonfarm
Employment




































































































































In(1), c isavectorofconstantterms,  k arecoefﬁcientmatricesforeachofK
lags, and ut is an error vector. The coefﬁcient matrices,  k, can be estimated
using ordinary least squares.3
Weareinterestedinisolatingtheaggregateeffectofashocktothehousing
component of GDP or employment. Consider the case of GDP and allow
residential investment to be the ﬁrst element of Yt; an obvious approach is
to treat the ﬁrst element of ut as the shock to residential investment, and use
the estimated  k matrices to determine the effect of this shock on all the
components of GDP and thus on GDP itself. Unfortunately, the elements of
ut are generally correlated within the period. That is, a high value for the
ﬁrst element of ut provides information about other elements of ut, and that
3 There are many good introductory treatments of VAR analysis; two examples are Sims




is called orthogonalization. Let us denote the covariance matrix of ut by  ,
Euu  =  . (2)
To orthogonalize the N errors ut, we decompose them into N errors vt, which
are a linear combination H of ut,
vt = Hut. (3)
For the matrix H to orthogonalize the errors, it must be the case that the





From (2)–(4), it follows that the linear transformation H must be related to
the covariance matrix   as follows:
H−1 
H−1 
=  . (5)
For ease of notation, deﬁne G ≡ H−1. Then we have
GG  =  . (6)
Thus, if we can ﬁnd a matrix G that satisﬁes (6), we can meaningfully trace
out the effects of the N different shocks vt on each of the variables Yt. Unfor-
tunately, there are generally many matrices G that satisfy (6). We will restrict
G to be lower triangular, meaning that it has only zeros above the diagonal.
There is a unique lower triangular G satisfying (6), and it is known as the
Cholesky matrix.
With the Cholesky approach to orthogonalization, it is natural to think
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Note that we have replaced ut in theVAR of (1) with Gvt. We say that Y1,t is
ordered ﬁrst in theVAR because only the ﬁrst element of vt affects Y1,t within
the period. With the Cholesky decomposition there is some justiﬁcation for
referringtotherandomvariablev1,t asashocktoY1,t.Inwhatfollows,wewill
order the housing component of GDP or employment ﬁrst in our VARs and
investigate the role of “housing shocks.” By ordering residential investment
ﬁrst, we unambiguously identify housing shocks—there is only one shock
that affects residential investment independently of the VAR’s dynamics (the
  matrices). Of course, one may wonder whether our results are robust to dif-
ferentorderings—perhapsthereismorethanoneshockthataffectsresidential
investment contemporaneously. This concern will be addressed.52 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 1 VAR Output Components
Category Share in 2002
Personal Consumption Expenditures (C) 69.4 percent
Government Expenditures (G) 19.7 percent
Nonresidential Fixed Investment (NFI) 10.2 percent
Residential Fixed Investment (RFI) 5.3 percent
Change in Inventories (dI) 0.1 percent
Net Exports (X) −4.8 percent
3. VAR FOR COMPONENTS OF GDP
Table 1 describes the breakdown of GDP into six components for which we
estimate the VAR, along with the 2002 GDP shares of those components.4
TheVAR will be speciﬁed in log levels for most of the variables.5 Net exports
and inventory investment need to be treated differently because they can be
negative; we include those variables in the VAR as shares of GDP. The VAR
contains ﬁve lags and is estimated over the period 1985:Q1–2009:Q4.6
As described above, the results that we emphasize have residential in-
vestment ordered ﬁrst in the VAR. The only shocks we study are shocks to
residential investment, so the ordering of the other variables is inconsequen-
tial. Because our primary interest is the relationship between the decline in
housing-related economic activity and the decline in overall activity, most of
our analysis will be based on economic conditions as of the end of 2005—the
peak of housing activity. We will look at the VAR’s forecasts conditional on
data through the end of 2005, and then ask how much shocks to residential
investment can account for the deviation of outcomes from the VAR’s fore-
cast. The variables in the VAR represent components of GDP, but we can
generate theVAR’s forecasts for GDP itself by appropriately transforming the
component forecasts.7
4 We use 2002 to describe the shares because it occurred neither during the height of the
housing boom nor during the depths of the bust.
5 See Sims, Stock, and Watson (1990) on levels estimation of VARs with nonstationary
variables.
6 We use ﬁve lags because we want to capture any residual seasonality while conserving on
parameters, given the relatively short sample.
7 If r,n,c,g,x,i represent, respectively, VAR forecasts for the logs of residential investment,
nonresidential investment, consumption, and government spending, and the GDP shares of net ex-
ports and inventory investment, we generate the forecast for GDP (Y) as follows:
Y =
expr +expn +expc +expg
1 − x − i
.S. E. Henly and A. L. Wolman: Housing and the Great Recession 53
Figure 6 Impulse Response Functions for Baseline VAR
RFI Response C Response x 10
3
NFI Response X Response x 10
3
G Response x 10
3




















































investment ﬁrst. Note the relatively large and persistent effects that shocks
to residential investment have on RFI, C, and NFI, which together account
for about 85 percent of GDP. Turning to the Great Recession, we illustrate
some of our main results in Figure 7. Focus ﬁrst on the two solid lines, which
represent the actual path of GDP (black) and the path forecasted by the VAR
conditional on data through the end of 2005 (gray). If we deﬁne “trend” as
the level of GDP forecasted by theVAR, then GDP was at or above trend until
the third quarter of 2008. In the fourth quarter of 2008 and the ﬁrst quarter of54 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 7 U.S. GDP: Sample Period 1985–2009
Observed
Forecast + RFI Shocks





























































2009 there was a steep decline in GDP.As of the fourth quarter of 2009, GDP




investment shock was relatively unimportant in that the forecast conditional
on the residential investment shock is close to the trend line. Starting in 2007,
the residential investment shock accounts for an ever larger shortfall of GDP
relative to trend. Yet until late 2008 GDP remains at or above trend because
other shocks are accounting for an ever larger surplus of GDP relative to
trend. The contribution of these other shocks (the other elements of vt)i s
indicated by the gap between the dashed and the solid gray lines in Figure
8 It is important to emphasize that our version of “trend” is itself inﬂuenced by the Great
Recession, since the VAR was estimated over the full sample.S. E. Henly and A. L. Wolman: Housing and the Great Recession 55
7.9,10 Finally, the effects of other shocks disappear in importance late in 2008,
andthecumulativeeffectofshockstoresidentialinvestmentleavesoutputwell
below trend in mid-2009. In the second half of 2009 other shocks contributed
to a signiﬁcant increase in GDP, allowing it to come back toward trend.
The most notable aspect of Figure 7 is that, from the standpoint of late
2005, the level of output in mid-2009—the trough—can be explained almost
entirely by a sequence of shocks to residential investment. Paraphrasing Sec-
tion 1, we asked to what extent the unusual decline in output could be un-
derstood as the usual response of output to an unusual decline in residential
investment. Based on the analysis presented in Figure 7, we have a two-part
answer: The severe decline in output from 2008:Q4–2009:Q2 is accounted
for primarily by shocks other than residential investment. However, in the
preceding two years those other shocks had worked in the opposite direction,
counteracting the negative effect of residential investment shocks. Thus, al-
though the sudden decline in output late in 2008 cannot be explained by the
economy’s response to residential investment, the low level of output reached
in mid-2009 can indeed be explained in this way. When ﬁltered by the VAR,
the severe decline in output looks like a delayed response to residential invest-
ment shocks that had been accumulating for years.
As a basic reality check on our story that shocks to residential investment
havebeenimportant,itisusefultolookataversionofFigure7thatsubstitutes
residential investment for GDP. The shock that we are referring to as a resi-
dential investment shock ought to be important for the behavior of residential
investment. Figure 8 shows this to be the case. Residential investment per-
sistently deviates from trend, and that deviation is overwhelmingly accounted
for by the residential investment shock.
Our results are remarkably robust to the way variables are ordered in
the VAR. For an ordering with residential investment in the nth position (our
baselinehasn = 1),wecallthenthshocktheRFIshock. Wecompareimpulse
responsefunctionsforourbaselinetothoseforn = 6andthereislittlechange
in the responses to the RFI shock. We also generate the analogue to Figure 7,
showing the contribution of the RFI shocks to GDP in the current recession,
for every Cholesky ordering. For every ordering, the difference between GDP
in 2009:Q4 and the level explained by RFI shocks only (i.e., the distance
between the solid black line and the dotted line) is less than 1.5 percent in
absolute value, and for a majority of the orderings the difference is less than
9 Because the VAR is speciﬁed in logs, in this and subsequent ﬁgures that plot levels, the
distances between (i) the dashed line and the gray line and (ii) the dotted line and the gray line
do not add up exactly to the distance between the black line and the gray line. In most cases
the discrepancy is small, though it is large in Figure 9.
10 From Figures 3 and 4 we can see that these offsetting shocks were reﬂected in the behavior
of nonresidential investment and consumption. It would of course be interesting to pursue an
economic interpretation of these offsetting shocks, but we leave that for future work.56 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 8 Residential Fixed Investment: Sample Period 1985–2009
Observed
Forecast + RFI Shocks








































































coming from RFI shocks was offset by other shocks in 2007 and early 2008.
Out-of-SampleApproach
Figures 7 and 8 were generated by aVAR for the (log) levels of GDP compo-
nents, estimated from 1985:Q1–2009:Q4. Here we look at the implications of
estimating theVAR only through 2005:Q4. Figures 9 and 10 are analogues to
Figures 7 and 8, where the estimation period ends in 2005:Q4—these ﬁgures
displayout-of-sampleforecasts. InFigure9,thedeviationofoutputfromtrend
at the end of the sample rises to almost 6 percent from 3 percent with the full
sample estimates. It is not surprising that output is further from the perceived
trend as of 2005:Q4 than it is from the currently perceived trend. The most
striking aspect of Figure 9, however, is the tremendous “overshooting” gen-
erated by the residential investment shock. The residential investment shock
aloneaccountsforashortfallofoutputfromtrendthatismorethanthreetimes
as large as the observed shortfall, meaning that the other shocks account for a
large positive deviation of output from trend (the dashed line). To understand
what is going on here, it helps to look at Figure 10, which plots residentialS. E. Henly and A. L. Wolman: Housing and the Great Recession 57
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ing bust is not in the sample, so the post-2005 trend for residential investment
does not involve a large decline (compare the solid gray lines in Figures 8 and
10). Of course the large decline in residential investment did occur, and the
VAR accounts for that decline primarily with shocks to residential investment
(the dotted line in Figure 10). Those shocks were extreme by historical stan-
dards so, according to the VAR, they should generate an extreme decline in
output—on the order of 21 percent! Such an extreme decline did not occur, so
the other shocks must account for an extreme increase in output (the dashed
line in Figure 9).
The Housing Boom
Our discussion thus far has centered on the housing bust and the subsequent
decline in real GDP. We can also use VAR methodology to investigate the
housing boom. Figures 11 and 12 provide the same information as Figures
7 and 8, except that the time scale is shifted back more than ﬁve years, to58 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure10 Residential Fixed Investment: Sample Period 1985–2005
Observed
Forecast + RFI Shocks



































































condition on data as of 2000:Q3 and then project ahead to 2006:Q1.11 It is
apparentinFigure11that,untillate2003,outputwasbelowtrendandresiden-
tial investment shocks accounted for little of the deviation from trend. For the
next two-and-a-half years, however, output increasingly exceeded trend, and
the deviation is more than accounted for by shocks to residential investment.
Figure 12 shows that residential investment deviated persistently from trend
fortheentireperiod,butitwasonlyafterthemiddleof2003thattheresidential
investment shocks began to account for an increasing share of the deviation.
By the end of the boom period, shocks to residential investment accounted for
most of the deviation of residential investment from trend. Figures 11 and 12
paint a picture of the housing boom changing shape in mid-2003. It would
be interesting to investigate whether there is corroborating evidence for this
view. For example, did underwriting standards for home mortgages change
around this time?
11 To generate Figures 11 and 12 we use the same full sample estimates that generated
Figures 7 and 8.S. E. Henly and A. L. Wolman: Housing and the Great Recession 59
Figure11 U.S. GDP, Housing Boom: Sample Period 1985–2009
Observed
Forecast + RFI Shocks



































































A Broader Perspective on Housing and Output
Although theVAR results are inﬂuenced by data as far back as 1985, we have
focusedexclusivelyoninterpretingthemostrecentbusinesscycle. Weshowed
that a shock to residential investment plays a central role in accounting for the
current shortfall in GDP relative to trend. The current recession is clearly
special in terms of its magnitude; is it also special in terms of the temporal
relationship between residential investment and output? There is an extensive
literaturearguingthathousingﬂuctuationsdohavepredictivepowerforfuture
GDPﬂuctuations,withLeamer(2007)asperhapsthemostforcefulproponent.
Here we provide some ﬁndings consistent with that view.
Figure 13 displays real residential investment for the eight quarters on




peak for each recession except for 2001. The current recession is unusual,
however, in the length of time during which residential investment fell before
the business cycle peak, and in the depth of the decline.60 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure12 Residential Fixed Investment, Housing Boom: Sample Period
1985–2009
Observed
Forecast + RFI Shocks












































































Next, we estimated a two-variable VAR in (log) residential investment
and GDP, over the period 1959–2009. The top panel of Figure 14 displays the
impulse response of GDP to a residential investment shock when residential
investment is ordered ﬁrst in the VAR. Indeed, a positive shock to residential
investmentgeneratesapositive, hump-shapedresponseofGDP,withthepeak
response of GDP occurring seven quarters after the shock. The same result
holdsiftheorderingofvariablesintheVARisreversed. IfweestimatetheVAR
overthemorerecentsample,thesamequalitativerelationshipholds. However,
the elapsed time between the arrival of the residential investment shock and
the peak in GDP increases from seven quarters to 14 quarters (bottom panel
of Figure 14). The 14-quarter lead time may seem high, given that the most
recent peak in residential investment occurred just 10 quarters before the peak
inGDP.Note, however, thatthepeakinresidentialinvestmentmostlikelywas
not a period in which there was a large positive residential investment shock.
In fact, the two-variableVAR shows that the peak own response of residential
investment to a shock occurs nine periods after the shock, using the estimates
for the recent sample.S. E. Henly and A. L. Wolman: Housing and the Great Recession 61
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4. VAR FOR COMPONENTS OF EMPLOYMENT
In Section 1 we saw that viewing the economy in terms of employment rather
than output led to a rather different picture of the relationship between hous-
ing activity and aggregate activity in the Great Recession. According to both
metrics, the decline in aggregate activity lagged the decline in housing. How-
ever, therawmagnitudesofthedeclineinhousingandaggregateactivitywere
roughly equal in the case of output, whereas overall employment fell by more
than 8 million, against a decline in housing employment of just 1.3 million!12
Based on the raw data then, it seems unlikely that identiﬁed shocks to housing
employment could succeed in explaining the decline in overall employment
in the way that residential investment shocks succeeded in explaining the de-
cline in GDP.VAR analysis will allow us to investigate formally whether that
intuition holds, or whether there is a large “housing employment multiplier”
that ampliﬁes the aggregate effects of shocks to housing employment.
12 We deﬁne housing employment here as the sum of employment in residential building
construction and residential specialty trade contractors.62 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure14 Impulse Response of GDP to RFI Shock: VAR with RFI and
GDP, RFI Ordered First
Panel A: Estimated on 1959--2009 Data
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We use data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’s establishment survey to
estimate a VAR for the components of employment. Employment is catego-
rizeddifferentlythanoutput,sothevariablesintheVARwillnotmatchupwell
with the variables in the outputVAR. Table 2 lists the components of employ-
mentintheVAR,alongwiththeirsharesoftotalnonfarmemploymentin2002.
In specifying a component of employment that represents “housing,” one has
tochoosehowtoclassifyspecialtytrades(e.g.,plumbing,painting). Specialty
trades comprise a sizable fraction of employment in the housing sector: In
2009:Q3 this number was approximately 70 percent. However, prior to 2001,
data for specialty trades employees are not broken down into residential and
nonresidential components. Thus, the choice is between including or omit-
ting all specialty trades from our housing employment number. We choose
to omit specialty trades so as to be conﬁdent that the employment categoryS. E. Henly and A. L. Wolman: Housing and the Great Recession 63
Table 2 Employment VAR Components




Nonresidential Construction 4.5 percent
Residential Construction 0.6 percent
Mining and Logging 0.4 percent
we call “housing” is not contaminated by other areas of economic activity,
such as commercial construction. Note that in 2002 residential construction
accounted for just 0.6 percent of total nonfarm payroll employment.
Figure15displaysthesamebasicsetofresultsforemploymentthatFigure
7 displays for output. The level of employment was on trend, if at all, only
through about late 2006, then climbed well above trend before beginning to
plummet—both absolutely and relative to trend—in the second half of 2008.
At the end of the sample, employment lay less than 2 percent below trend.13





than the decline in housing-related employment that it seemed unlikely that
the decline in overall employment could be explained as the usual response to
a housing shock. Surprisingly, the housing shock is relatively unimportant in
accounting for the weakness in employment in housing (Figure 16).
5. CONCLUSION
The NBER-deﬁned recession that began in December 2007 has been referred
to by many as the Great Recession. Indeed, the facts presented in Figure
1 conﬁrm that the current recession stands out as particularly severe among
post-1950 recessions. Why such a severe recession occurred is a question that
will likely never be answered deﬁnitively. However, researchers in academia,
government (including central banks), and the private sector have argued con-
vincingly for the importance of various factors in the severity of the reces-
sion. Some of the factors that have been discussed are the ﬁnancial crisis of
September 2008, the dramatic increase in oil prices from January 2007–July
13 We deﬁne trend as the level of employment predicted (in sample) by the VAR conditional
on data through December 2005. Although employment has fallen much more in percentage terms
than GDP, according to the VAR output is actually further from trend than employment.64 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly







































Forecast + Residential Construction Shocks








Dec 05 Jun 06 Dec 06 Jun 07 Dec 07 Jun 08 Dec 08 Jun 09 Dec 09
2008(Hamilton2009), andinappropriatemonetarypolicyinmid-to-late2008
(Hetzel 2009, Sumner 2009).
AlmostalldiscussionsoftheGreatRecession,however,includesomerole
for the housing boom and bust. Residential investment declined before and
during the Great Recession by about the same amount as GDP, although the
decline in GDP occurred with a lag. This observation led us to investigate
whether the severity of the recession could be understood as the typical re-
sponse to a shock emanating from the housing sector. With respect to output,
the answer is a qualiﬁed “yes”: Viewed from the peak of the housing boom,
subsequent shocks to residential investment can account for the level of GDP
late in 2009. The qualiﬁcation is that these shocks to residential investment
account for approximately zero GDP growth over 2007–2009—they do not
account for the sharp decline in late 2008 and early 2009. Similar analysis
conductedonemploymentdataattributesmuchoftheshortfallinemployment
from trend to a housing shock by the end of the sample. However, over much
ofthesampleshocksemanatinginhomeconstructionpushemploymentabove
trend.
Because there is no economics in our VAR model, our results cannot
be used to talk about policies that should have or could have been used toS. E. Henly and A. L. Wolman: Housing and the Great Recession 65
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lessen the recession’s severity. Further, our results cannot rule out that shocks
emanating from monetary or ﬁnancial policy may have played a role in the
Great Recession. However, those results may be useful as an input to future
economic modelling that can be used to discuss policy. It is clear that any
macroeconomic model used to address the Great Recession ought to have a
housing sector. Less trivially, such a model ought to be consistent with (1) the
fact that housing’s contribution to GDP fell by roughly the same amount as
the subsequent fall in GDP, and (2) our ﬁnding that a shock originating in, or
initially reﬂected in, the housing sector can broadly account for the behavior
of GDP during the Great Recession. Any modelling along these lines also
faces the challenge that the sectoral behavior of employment followed a very
different pattern than the sectoral behavior of output.66 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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